Education
- Ph.D candidate in Economics, HEC Paris, 2027 (expected)
- Summer 2025, Summer Graduate Program, Research Department of the European Central Bank
- Fall 2024/25, Visiting Scholar, University of Pennsylvania - Economics. Sponsor: Guillermo Ordonez
- M.S. in Management Sciences, HEC Paris, 2023
- M.S. in Economics, Bocconi University, 2020
- B.S. in Economics, Bocconi University, 2017
Presentations & Awards
- The Wharton Scool, Finance (Internal presentation), Fall 2024. Paris Macro Workshop, May 2025. European Central Bank (Internal Seminar), May 2025. Economics Letters Summer School in Macro-Finance at Bocconi SDA, July 2025. ICBFS Conference Piacenza, Sep 2025. University of Naples Federico II PhD workshop, Sep 2025. Université Paris Dauphine - PSL PhD Workshop, Jun 2026.
- Awards: 2026 Lamfalussy Research Fellowship.
Work experience
- EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, Apr 2020 - Jun 2021
- Traineeship (1 year) + Research Analyst (3 months)
- Area: Monetary Analysis
- Main Activities: Data collection (Orbis, ECB series), macroeconometric analysis of time series data (including monetary aggregates, bank lending volumes and interest rates), Microeconometric analysis of firm panel data (balance sheets, firm-bond links).
Teaching
- Lecturer, Introduction to Macroeconomics, HEC Paris (MSc in Economics and Finance). 2022, 2023
- Teaching assistant for Prof. Michau, Advanced Macroeconomics: Business Cycle, Ecole Polytechnique. 2023, 2024, 2025
- Teaching assistant for Prof Ai-Ting Goh, Macroeconomics, HEC Paris (MBA). 2024, 2025
- Instructor, Game Theory for Negotiation (Professional Training), delivered at the Council of the European Union. (ESSEC IRENE France) 2026
Job Market Paper
Quantifying the role of imperfect competition and asymmetric information in bank pricing: evidence from loan rate dispersion đź“„ (Draft)
Using French loan-level data, we document substantial dispersion in interest rates among otherwise similar firms, even when they borrow from the same bank. We further show that unexplained rate residuals correlate with surprises in firms’ future credit risk outcomes, in line with an information channel in loan pricing. The central question is the extent to which observed dispersion reflects true differences in borrower risk versus the extra-value that banks manage to extract. To address this, we develop and calibrate a model of loan pricing with imperfect competition and costly information acquisition by banks. Dispersion can be the result of costly banks’ screening, where the acquisition of negative signals on firms translates into higher rate offers; or the optimal bank strategy in a non-competitive environment, in which a deviation from the law of one price is possible and banks can extract firms’ surplus. The calibrated results suggest that imperfect competition is the prevailing force driving observed dispersion.
Other work in progress
Banks, Peer-to-Peer lending platforms and the transmission of monetary policy: loan-level evidence from France, with Mattia Girotti (Banque de France) and Andrea Polo (LUISS, Rome)
Business lending practices in Europe are quickly evolving as more digital and AI platforms enter the corporate credit market, traditionally dominated by banks. Using loan level data from France, we analyse the different lending behaviour of banks and peer to peer platforms to firms in response to high-frequency monetary policy shocks.